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Abstract—Decision making is a critical issue for humans oper-
ating unmanned vehicles. However, it is well admitted that many
cognitive biases affect human judgments, leading to suboptimal
or irrational decisions. The framing effect is a typical cognitive
bias causing people to react differently depending on the context,
the probability of the outcomes and how the problem is presented
(loss vs. gain). There is a need to better understand the effects
of these biases in operational contexts to optimize human-robot
interactions. We therefore conducted an experiment involving a
framing paradigm in a search and rescue mission (earthquake)
and in a Mars rock sampling mission. We manipulated the fram-
ing (positive vs. negative) and the probability of the outcomes.
Our findings revealed that the way the problem was presented
(positively or negatively framed) and the emotional commitment
(saving lives vs. collecting the good rock) statistically affected the
choices made by the human operators.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing discussion
about the merits of totally autonomous robots versus the
importance of user control and decision making [1]. On the
one hand, the advancement in artificial intelligence decision-
making techniques for aerial robots, also known as drones,
has significantly increased the number of applications for a
team of autonomous agents (for instance, search and rescue
missions [2]–[4], autonomous infrastructure inspection [5], or
autonomous patrolling systems [6]–[8]). On the other hand,
the continuous evolution of Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)
allows human operators to improve more and more their
performances in controlling and deciding. Mixed-initiative
interaction provides the interface between these two worlds
considering that the agents’ (human and robot) abilities are
complementary and are likely to provide better performance
when joined efficiently than when used separately [1], [9],
[10].
However, poor user interface design, complexity of au-
tomation and high operational pressure can leave the human
operator ill-equipped when mental workload exceeds human
mental budget [11]. For instance, careless design of authority
sharing can lead to human-automation conflicts when the
human operator misunderstands the automation behavior [12],
[13]. The occurrence of such a situation is critical as long as
it may cause “mental confusion” [13] or attentional tunneling
(i.e., the human operator is excessively focused on a specific
area of a display) [14] causing irrational behavior [15].
Moreover, research suggests that when human decision-
makers have to make critical decisions under uncertainty
and imperfect information conditions or in situation where
they are emotionally involved, like during natural disasters,
emergencies, military operations or any other unpredictable
and diffuse environment, people are more susceptible to make
predictable errors in judgment caused by cognitive biases [16].
In order to overmatch these situations and remain adaptive and
effective amid a complex and ambiguous environment it is
important to understand and deal with these hard-wired human
processes [17].
This study is part of a broader work in a robust mixed-
initiative multi-agent planning, control, and execution frame-
work that maximizes joint performance, based on predefined
guidelines, by taking into account the abilities and limitations
of each agent (see Fig. 1). Here, “robust” means that the
system has satisfactory performance even when reality differs
from assumptions and the multi-agent team is composed by a
group of drones and a human operator.
The guidelines are statements and recommendations that
determine a course of action in consonance with the decisions
of the authority in charge of the mission. They can suggest
the trade-off criteria for deciding during the execution time,
for instance, of a specific mission what is more important:
accuracy or speed.
In this framework, each drone obtains its movement strate-
gies by using a game-theoretical approach and should adapt
the interaction with the operator (via a graphical user interface
- GUI) by framing the situation according to the guidelines
given by the mission authorities (see Fig. 1). The human
operator is in charge of the “hard decisions”, under conditions
of uncertainty and with time constraints. The framing, in this
context, should explore the human cognitive biases [17] in
order to improve the overall systems performance.
For this purpose, a framing-effect experiment was carried
out, where the drone team was supervised by a human opera-
tor, in order to evaluate the presence of such a framing context.
For this, two different scenarios were designed: helping vic-
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Fig. 1. Framework architecture
tims of an earthquake and sampling rocks on Mars. The final
objective is, in future work, to take into account these cognitive
biases (1) to adjust the utility functions of the drones and (2)
to adapt dynamically human-robot interactions.
This work is organized as follows: Section II presents the
theory about Framing Effect (FE) and how it can affects the
human inferences in a specific situation. In order to verify
the FE “power”, experiments are carried out as described in
Section III. The results of the experiments are presented in
Section IV. Finally conclusions and future work are discussed
in Section V.
II. FRAMING EFFECT
According to Descriptive Theories of decision making, the
Framing Effect (FE) is the finding that different descriptions
of formally identical problems can result in different choices.
The core concepts that explain it reside in the combination
of beliefs, fears, values, mental models, and so on, which
human beings use to perceive a situation. People effectively
look through this frame in the way they would look through
colored sunglasses. The frame significantly affects how we
infer meaning and hence understand the situation [16].
During the past decades, psychologists have been intensely
interested in the two main modes of thinking among humans:
intuitive and analytical [16]. According to Prospect Theory
[18], intuitive thinking operates automatically and quickly,
with little or no effort and totally unconscious, allowing people
to multitask in a complex world. The crucial benefits of
intuitive thinking are that it is time efficient and requires
relatively little allocation of mental resources. By generalizing
circumstances, it allows us to reduce the complexity of a
situation, recognize patterns (real or perceived) and make
decisions quickly according to past experiences or the logic
of those recognized patterns. However, while this mode of
thinking is exceptionally efficient and very often accurate, it
makes us more vulnerable to errors.
On the other hand, analytical thinking requires conscious
mental effort. It allows us to process information deliberately,
consciously contemplate alternatives, debate with others and
come to logical and effective conclusions.
Both modes of thinking are constantly active in our minds,
but analytical thinking is typically relegated to simply mon-
itoring the cognitive activities and can be called only when
necessary. It is activated when we detect an error or when
some rule-based reasoning is required [16].
Moreover, research has shown that losses evokes stronger
negative feelings than gains [19] and choices are not reality-
bound because intuitive thinking is not bound to reality.
Reframing is effortful and analytical thinking is normally lazy.
Unless there is an obvious reason to do otherwise, most people
passively accept decision problems as they are framed and
therefore rarely have an opportunity to discover the extent to
which their preferences are frame-bound rather than reality-
bound.
Kahneman [16] affirms that human beings dispose of a
limited budget of attention that can be allocated to activities,
and they will fail if try to go beyond their budget. Intense
focusing on a task can make people effectively blind, even to
stimuli that normally attract attention.
In summary, Prospect Theory shows that emotions can help
play a role in decision-making when information is incomplete
or too complex, to serve at times as critical rules of thumb.
In [20] a typology is presented to distinguish among three
different kinds of framing effects: (1) Risk Choice Framing
[21], which involves options differing in level of risk and
described in different ways; (2) Attribute Framing, which af-
fects the evaluation of the characteristics of an event or object;
and (3) Goal Framing, which affects the persuasiveness of a
communication. Attribute Framing seems to be the simplest
case of framing, where only a single attribute is the subject of
the framing manipulation and the evaluation can be measured
by choices between yes or no. Attribute Framing effects are
also less likely when dealing with extremes. So, we have
chosen to study the Attribute Framing effect influence in a
drone operation situation.
III. EXPERIMENTS
With two scenarios, an experimental protocol was designed
to observe the FE influence over the decision of releasing
or not a first-aid kit (first scenario) or collecting or not a
rock (second scenario). To achieve this, a simulation with a
graphical interface (see Fig. 2) common to both scenarios was
set up in Python 2.7.11. The left panel has a 3D environment
where operators can change the point of view as they wish.
During the simulation, three drones (2) with a limited capacity
to identify their targets depart from the base (1) to the search
zone (3). The control panel at right shows (4) the status of
the drones, where the buttons change colors when any of
them needs an operator decision; (5) the battery level of each
drone; (6) the sectors already visited, here the gray intensity
is correlated to the type of search pattern used by the drone;
and (7) the number of kits or storage places available for the
mission in a given moment.
We suppose, for a such mission, the drones would be driven
individually by a decisional framework, which should allow
them to take a decision based on an expectation (reward
Fig. 2. Operator’s interface.
expectation). This expectation would be function of the belief
of a drone at the moment of questioning the operator. The
belief (percentage, for instance) would define in this case a
rational decision.
Next, the two scenarios defined to evaluate the presence of
a framing effect are briefly presented.
A. First scenario - Earthquake
In this scenario, an earthquake happened and there are eight
victims in the middle of the wreckage. Some of them totally
or partially buried under layers of concrete. The operator
(subject) use the drones to identify the victims and eight
available kits. The guideline is to find and deliver a first-aid
kit to the maximum number of victims within a certain time
period.
B. Second scenario - Mars rock sampling
Now, the subject is working in a Mars sample return mission
where eight different types of rock are searched. The three
drones are available for the mission and a capsule with eight
storage places is available to return the rocks to Earth. The
guideline is to find and collect the maximum number of “good”
rocks before the time is up.
C. Research questions
The goal of these experiments is to answer the following
research questions:
- Is the FE present in this context?
- Does the emotional commitment influence the FE effi-
ciency?
- Has the Time to answer any influence over the FE
efficiency?
- Do the operator’s levels of confidence and satisfaction
increase when the framing is aligned to a good choice?
- What effects have Positive or Negative framed questions
and Probability on the operator’s decision?
- Is there a choice of Framed questions that could provide
a predictable decision regardless the Probability?
D. Experimental protocol
In order to evaluate the results of this experiment, two
explanatory variables have being used: (1) Text Framing and
(2) the Probability that a kit would be useful or not (earthquake
scenario) or the target be or not a “good” rock.
The Text Framing is the way how the questions are pre-
sented (positive or negative). In the earthquake scenario, for
the Positive frame a sentence was presented like: “There is
70% of chance that the kit will be useful” and for the Negative
frame it was: “There is 30% of chance that the kit will be
wasted”. In the case of the Mars rock sampling scenario, for
the Positive frame a sentence was presented such as: “There
is 70% of chance of being a ‘good’ rock” and: “There is 30%
of chance of being a ‘bad’ rock”, otherwise.
For the Probability, four levels of interest were selected:
Low (from 0.13 to 0.25), Middle-Low (from 0.37 to 0.49),
Middle-High (from 0.51 to 0.63) and High (from 0.75 to 0.87).
Each level represents a range of 12.5%. Two more levels were
introduced with the intention of hiding these levels of interest,
they are: Extreme Low (from 0.01 to 0.12) and Extreme High
(from 0.88 to 0.99).
This experiment involved two factors with many levels
(2 types of sentences and 4 probability levels). In general,
factorial designs are most efficient for this situation [22],
because in each complete trial of the experiment all possible
level combinations of the factors are investigated. In this sense,
this factorial design requires 8 runs for each combination (i.e.
2∗4) to be tested in each scenario, consequently, each subject
must take at least 8 different decisions during the experiment.
Additionally, the confidence and satisfaction levels of the
participants about their performance after each mission was
checked with a seven-points Likert-type scale. At the end of
the experiment they were invited to answer a questionnaire.
E. Execution
Fourteen individuals (28% female, mean age of 30.57 with
a standard deviation of 7.63), all volunteers, participated in the
experiment. The participants were, unkown to them, randomly
split into two groups (one for each scenario). They were not
rewarded for the participation.
Each participant randomly executed 10 missions. During
the evolution of a given mission, when the drones found
something, 10 different types of sentences (2 types of frames
* 5 levels of probabilities) were randomly presented and the
operator was requested to decide. Every two of the sentences
had the same level of Probability, one with a positive frame
and the other with a negative one. The subjects had 10 seconds
to decide between say “YES”, i.e, take a positive action
(release a kid or collect a rock), or “NO”. After this time
period, the drone who asked should consider the operator’s
decision as a “NO”.
In this sense, the only action available to the operator
was to answer the questions made by the drones, which the
participants were oriented to answer as accurately and quickly
as possible. Note that half of the sentences had less than 50%
of probability, then, if an operator chose as strategy to do a
positive action (release a kit or sample a rock) only with a
probability above that value in a positive frame or below that
value in a negative one, fatally he or she would say “YES”
only 4 times per mission.
Notice that, it was not possible to know the real result
of the mission, i.e., the operator could not know how many
victims were helped or “good” rocks were collected during
the experiment.
IV. RESULTS
We have collected 1390 observations from 14 subjects.
Because we have taken multiple measures per subject, which
would violate the independence assumption of a linear model
(in fact, every person has some idiosyncratic factor that affects
all responses from the same subject), a Linear Mixed Model
was used [23] to deal with this situation. Adding some random
effects for subject allows us to resolve this non-independence
by assuming a different baseline for each subject.
In this mixed design, we tested our hypotheses comparing
the results of the two scenarios using a Generalized Linear
Mixed Model - GLMM [24]. GLMMs are an extension of
linear mixed models to allow response variables from different
distributions, such as binary responses (“YES” or “NO”).
In this study we have been interested in the relationship
between operator’s decision (OD) and the main explanatory
variables: Scenario (S), Text framing (TF ) and Probability
(P ) (see Eq. (1)).
OD ∼ S + TF + P +  (1)
First of all, the random factors , that was not possible
to control experimentally, were unpacked in two different
variables: ID and Seq. The first one referred to the as-
sumption of a different intercept for each subject and the
second one referred to the sequence of the missions, which
were shuffled for each subject. Several null models with only
these random effects and their interactions were designed and
tested (Likelihood Ratio Test - LRT) in order to select the
important ones, then, all the others “stochastic” differences
have remained in the error term . The final null model is
presented in Eq. (2) (LRT:χ2(1) = 10.941, p = 0.0009404).
OD ∼ 1 + (1|ID) + (1|Seq) +  (2)
Figure 3 shows a dotplot of the random effect terms. Here
is possible to see the effects of each operator and the mission
sequence on the decision process as well as their standard
errors to help identify how distinct the random effects are
from one another. The first plot shows that some subjects (we
suppressed their IDs) are more meticulous (negative values)
than others in their choices, while the second demonstrates that
the subjects used to change their strategies over time, reducing
their minimal threshold to do an action. These two effects were
informed by 65.2% of the participants in the questionnaire at
the end of the experiment.
We started the statistical analysis with a model with all fixed
effects available and dropped one by one until all unnecessary
terms were removed, for instance: age and gender. In order to
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Fig. 3. Random effects by (a) subject and (b) Mission sequence
check the goodness of fit (GOF) of each model, the Hosmer
and Lemeshow test [25] was used. And, at the end, the model
was checked to make sure that the data were not overdispersed
[26].
In order to answer the research questions (cf. Sec. III-C),
some hypotheses were made.
A. Hypothesis H1
To answer the first research question, which was “Is the
FE present in this context?”, we elaborated the following
hypothesis:
- H1A : 1 The operators’ decision are different, in a similar
situation, according to the equivalent version of choice pre-
sented, a negative or a positive one.
Here, there is a significant difference (Positive :
Estimate = 0.280, sd = 0.109, z = 2.553, p = 0.0107)
between positive and negative framing in a GLMM analy-
sis (LRT: χ2(2) = 35.997, p = 1.525e − 08). The small
p − value(0.0107) indicates that we would reject the null
hypothesis H10 in favor of H1A. In this sense, we can confirm
the presence of the FE in the experiment.
B. Hypothesis H2
Looking to the next research question: Does the emotional
commitment influence the FE efficiency?, another hypothesis
was defined:
- H2A : The positive frame will be more effective in situations
of emotional commitment (first scenario).
Results of a GLMM (LRT : χ2(4) = 47.043, p = 1.494e−
09) show that there is a significant difference between the two
scenarios (Mars : Estimate = −0.526, sd = 0.246, z =
−2.133, p = 0.032). The negative estimated value (−0.526)
refers to the Mars scenario and suggests that people are
willing to take more risks when they are emotionally involved
(Earthquake scenario). Figure 4 shows the influences of Text
framing and Scenario variables in the operators’ decisions. The
difference of behavior between the two scenarios demonstrates
that the participants appeared to take more risks when they
1The subscript “A” represents the alternative hypothesis, in contrast with
the null hypothesis “0”.
Negative Positive
22.5
25.0
27.5
No Yes No Yes
Operators’ decisions
M
ea
n Scenario
Earth
Mars
Fig. 4. Average operators’ decisions in function of the Text framing and the
Scenario
2
4
6
8
10
In agreement Not in agreement
Framing accordance
Ti
m
e
to
an
sw
er
(s
ec
on
ds
)
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sequence
Ti
m
e
to
an
sw
er
2.3
2.5
2.7
median
Fig. 5. Time to answer in function of the (a) text framing and the (b) sequence
of missions.
were thinking about saving lives. The positive frame, in
contrast with the negative one, was more effective in the
earthquake scenario, confirming H2A.
C. Hypothesis H3
In relation to the time to answer influence on the framing
efficiency, the following hypothesis was analyzed:
- H3A : The more time is devoted to answer a question the
less effective is the FE.
Figure 5 (a) demonstrates that in general when the sub-
jects answered not in accordance with the framing presented
they expended more time than otherwise (Estimate =
−0.120, sd = 0.060, z = −2.004, p = 0.045), confirming
the H3A. Maybe here they were using the analytical thinking
mode instead of the intuitive one. Also regarding the time to
answer, it is apparent from (b) a training effect from the first to
the last mission executed, reducing the average time to answer,
regardless of the missions, once they were randomly presented
to each subject. This suggests a translation from the analytical
to the intuitive thinking mode, where the FE is more effective.
D. Hypothesis H4
With the purpose of observing the satisfaction and confi-
dence levels in function of the operators’ decisions, we defined
the following hypothesis:
- H4A : The operators’ levels of Confidence and Satisfaction
will increase when they believe that they made the best choice
possible in a given situation.
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Fig. 6. Satisfaction and confidence levels in function of the operator’s positive
actions
Figure 6 shows these levels according to the number of
positive actions executed (to release a first aid kit or to collect a
rock). This criterion was used because, as already said before,
it was not possible to know the results of the operators’ actions
(if they really helped some victims or collected some “good”
rocks, respectively) at the end of a given mission. It is possible
to see a significant correlation between these factors and their
actions (LRT: Satisfaction : χ2(2) = 163.77, p < 2.2e− 16
and Confidence : χ2(1) = 66.064, p < 2.2e − 16), which
indicates that we would reject H40 in favor of H4A.
E. Hypothesis H5
In order to answer two research questions: (a) What effects
have Positive or Negative framed questions and Probability on
the operator’s decision? and (b) Is there a choice of Framed
questions that could provide a predictable decision regardless
the Probability?, one last hypothesis was proposed:
- H5A : The higher the Probability more the operator will
be willing to say “yes” for the Positive framing and “no”
otherwise.
Looking to Figure 7, it is apparent that H5A is corroborated
(GLMM model LRT: χ2(12) = 1216.1, p < 2.2e − 16).
Also, we can see again that the positive framing is more
effective in the earthquake scenario (Hypothesis H2) and the
negative framing, in the rock sampling one. Interestingly, in the
case of the negative framing with a “Middle-High” probability
(between 51% and 63% of chance), in contrast to the positive
framing with a “Middle-Low” probability (between 37% and
49% of chance), that are equivalent versions to present the
same situation, the expected rational decision was a “NO” (not
to launch a kit or collect a rock), but this only occurred in the
Mars scenario with a negative framing. Possibly, the subjects,
realizing that it was not possible to accomplish the missions
with a 100% of success (releasing all eight kits or collecting
eight rocks) with a threshold close to 50%, they reduced
their thresholds in the next missions under the “Middle-
Low” probability for the positive framing (respectively for the
negative framing), as the majority of them (65.2%) reported
in the questionnaire. Please, note that answer ”YES” for the
“Middle-Low” probability in the Positive Frame case can also
be explained by the emotional commitment that influences
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Fig. 7. Operators’ decisions in function of the framing and the scenario
participants to be more risky in the earthquake scenario (cf.
Sec. IV-B and Fig. 7).
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In order to understand what could influence human oper-
ators while making critical decisions under uncertainty and
imperfect information conditions, a framing effect experiment
was carried out. With a software simulator, two different sce-
narios were presented to the participants: (1) helping victims
of an earthquake and (2) sampling rocks on Mars. During the
experiment, we manipulated the framing (positive vs. negative)
and the probability of the outcomes. Some hypotheses where
defined to analyze the data collected. Results showed that
the way the problem was presented (positively or negatively
framed) and the emotional commitment (saving lives vs.
collecting rocks) statistically affected the choices made by the
human operators. As informed before, this is part of a work in
progress, until this point 14 subjects have been observed. We
are recruiting more participants and selecting new variables
(Color Visual Framing, for instance) to observe.
The objective is, in future work, to take into account these
cognitive biases to set the utility functions of the drones and
to adapt dynamically human-robot interactions. The expected
contributions of this work are: the introduction of a adaptive
framework that, taking into account some guidelines previ-
ously defined, will be able to modify the utility functions of the
drones and frame the communication with the human operator
in order to optimize the mission results.
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